11. Although Rodriguez would not agree, I have drawn this conclusion based on figures provided by Rodriguez and Weisbrot.

12. The Venezuelan programs use a mixture of cash transfers, general subsidies, block grants to neighborhoods, and technical assistance to individuals and groups, in addition to providing services in health, education, and vocational training.

13. In addition to the debate between Rodriguez and Weisbrot, see recent studies by D'Elia and Cabezas (2008), Patruyo (2008), and Penfold-Becerra (2005).

14. Latinobarómetro, cited in *The Economist*, "A Warning for Reformers," 15 November 2007, www.economist.com/world/la/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10136464 (accessed 1 April 2008).

15. *Latinobarómetro Report 2005* reports that the three primary meanings of democracy for Latin Americans are liberty, elections, and an economic system that provides a dignified income, though the relative weight of each of these factors varies by country. For example, in Brazil, a dignified income ranks the highest, while in Venezuela liberty ranks the highest, followed by elections. www.latinobarometro.org.

16. This is the popular term given to the new Bolivarian economic elite emerging under the Chávez administration.

6

Bolivia's MAS: Between Party and Movement

Santiago Anria

In the national elections of December 2005, Evo Morales Ayma obtained an unprecedented 53.7 percent of the popular vote.[1] It was the first time in Bolivian history that an Aymara peasant was elected president of the country, and the first time in Bolivian democratic history that a candidate reached the presidency without going through a congressional runoff.[2] Compared to other left-of-center figures who in recent years have been elected to office in Latin America, Morales and his Movement Toward Socialism (Movimiento al Socialismo, or MAS) gained government by successfully articulating the heterogeneous demands of groups disenfranchised by neoliberalism into a powerful electoral coalition, which among others included coca-producing indigenous peasants, laid-off miners and other sectors of organized labor, peasant groups with land claims, and indigenous movements with indigenous rights and cultural claims. The peculiarity of the Bolivian case is that this coalition building occurred amid a spiral of mass protests and widespread crisis of representation, in which the social movements, under the MAS banner, managed to move beyond mass demonstrations and enter into the electoral democratic terrain.

Only ten years after its emergence, MAS has spread to the cities and become the country's dominant political force. Although Morales has concentrated a great deal of power in his hands and has often bypassed institutional channels to accomplish his goals, for which he is frequently labeled a "populist" and equated to Hugo Chávez or Rafael Correa, his command of MAS is rooted in years of peasant grassroots mobilization. This, in effect, constitutes an antithesis of populism in its various conceptions (Roberts 2007a, 2007b). For authors like Levitsky and Roberts, moreover, what makes Morales different from many other leftist leaders is that his political leadership is spawned by, and remains accountable to, autonomous popular movements organized from below (Levitsky and Roberts, forthcoming). According to these authors, mobilization from below does, in fact, impose real constraints on Morales's

leadership. However, there is still little work showing how these accountability mechanisms function on the ground. This chapter shows that political accountability structures operate in multiple dimensions, both inside and outside MAS, and that MAS is neither exclusively bottom-up nor solely top-down, but a complex combination of both schema. The chapter also shows that as a hybrid post-liberal organization (see Arditi in this volume), MAS has different organizational logics and linkage patterns with rural *and* urban constituents. How are these articulated? How does this inform our understanding of the Bolivian experiments with post-liberal politics? And, ultimately, what does it tell us about the broader Latin American left turns?

The goal of this chapter is to provide a detailed description of the inner workings of the Bolivian MAS. By dissecting its organizational features and analyzing its practices in two major cities, La Paz and El Alto, it analyzes the degree to which MAS is constituted by newer, more egalitarian and participatory forms of leader-mass linkages or, conversely, whether it is illustrative of the same illiberal populism that has characterized older national-populist parties in Bolivia and elsewhere in the region. Although MAS has adopted illiberal practices from older national-populist parties like, say, the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario, or MNR) and Conscience of the Fatherland (Conciencia de la Patria, or CONDEPA), I suggest that what is unique to its experience is its rural roots in the coca-growing Chapare region, where it works under bottom-up and more decentralized and egalitarian schemes of participation. Its illiberal features are most prominent in urban settings, where MAS replicates top-down patron-client logics of participation. My larger aim is to properly situate MAS in comparative politics and determine how much its experience is distinctively Bolivian and, conversely, how much it pertains to broader phenomena in the region.

MAS was born of social movements in the rural areas of the Chapare region. Today, however, to deem it uncritically as a peasant party is to ignore its organizational flexibility and the broader coalition of interests that it represents, as it has successfully expanded itself to Bolivia's largest cities and surged to the forefront of national politics. MAS has articulated itself by building a powerful electoral coalition amid a "great protests cycle" (Ibarra Güell 2003), which was initiated as a popular resistance to neoliberalism and intensified during the Bolivian resource wars. In alluding to these, I refer to the Water War in April 2000, which started as a collective rejection of increases in the water tariff in Cochabamba and entailed a struggle between its residents and the US company Bechtel over the privatization of water. I also refer to the Gas War of October 2003 in the highlands of El Alto, which sparked as a collective reaction against President Sánchez de Lozada's intention to export natural gas to the United States through Chilean ports. Protests faced state repression, leaving dozens dead and forcing the resignation of the president. The high levels of agitation

that characterized this period culminated with Morales's rise to power, with social movements playing leading roles in the country's liberal democratic institutions, and with an opportunity for deepening democracy. MAS's rise to power has signified the possibility for popular-based movements to "move beyond the framework of liberal participation" (Arditi, Chapter 8 in this volume). In other words, resistance to neoliberalism and a crisis of representation provided popular organizations with the opportunity to innovate in matters of political representation and participation. Social movements in Bolivia have done so through the creation of a "political instrument," MAS, a hybrid organization through which they have embraced post-liberal politics by participating in representative institutions without abandoning nonelectoral street politics.

When Morales assumed office in 2006, he called for a "sociocultural" and "democratic" revolution while announcing that he would rule by obeying the people (Movimiento al Socialismo 2006:43). Once in power, he addressed the demands set forth during the above mass mobilizations; thus he declared nationalization of natural gas and oil resources, proclaimed an agrarian reform, and called for a constituent assembly through which popularly elected delegates would seek to refound the republic along deeper egalitarian grounds (Cameron and Sharpe, Chapter 4 in this volume). Those long-held demands were fulfilled by centralizing power in the presidency, bypassing institutional channels, and often disrespecting checks and balances, reasons for which Morales has received harsh criticisms (Toranzo Roca 2008; Molina 2007). Notwithstanding such criticisms, one could argue that the above policies are examples of Morales's positive accountability to his social base: he did what he had promised to the people.

This chapter is divided into four parts. The first part lays out the conceptual groundwork for this chapter. The second part provides a brief background on contemporary Bolivian politics and discusses the origins and contemporary structure of the MAS organization, as well as Morales's government. I briefly explore MAS's emergence in rural areas of Bolivia, arguing that this "genetic coding" (Panebianco 1988) has indelibly shaped its organizational features even as it became a ruling force. Drawing on fieldwork conducted in La Paz and El Alto, the third part of this chapter explores how MAS operates in these cities, which are bastions of its electoral support. The chapter concludes by discussing how the Bolivian case can be situated in the broader context of Latin America's "left turns."

Conceptualizing MAS

Before turning to an account of the birth and operations of MAS, it is necessary to clarify some conceptual issues. How can we define MAS? If a political party, for instance, is "any group that presents at elections, and is capable of placing

through elections, candidates to higher office" (Sartori 1976:64), then MAS is a political party. However, due to the conditions of its emergence as a coca-eradication resistance movement and its peculiar rise to state power amid a cycle of mass protests, it has become clear that MAS transcends the minimalist definition of a political party, although it has adapted itself to that institutional form in order to participate in liberal democratic institutions of representation. Conversely, it cannot be defined simply as a social movement because, through its participation in these institutions, it goes beyond that notion.

MAS's leaders define the organization as a "political instrument" of the peasant indigenous movements, rather than a conventional political party. They categorically associate parties with institutions that divide rather than unite popular forces—organizations that, it should be noted, excluded a broad segment of society from political participation and that underwent a legitimacy crisis in the early 2000s. The instrument is, following their view, a political extension of a group of social organizations that triggered its creation as a tactical move whereby participation in the electoral process could contribute to complete self-representation in the existing liberal democratic institutions. This idea, which implies a sort of continuity between the social movement and the electoral institution, was advanced by Álvaro García Linera (Linera, León, and Monje 2004:448–455).[3] While appealing, this notion is imprecise. On the one hand, it is true that the lines that separate the party and the founding organizations are diffuse (Núñez 2008). On the other hand, MAS is more than an electoral appendage of the peasant organizations in the Chapare, and it is more than the political extension of a social movement, as it now represents not only those who founded the instrument but a broader coalition of forces.

For J. Komadina and C. Geffroy (2007), MAS is a "political movement" because it "operates between the boundaries of civil society and the political arena in a double direction: it codifies and projects both the mobilizations and the representations of diverse social organizations toward the institutionalized political arena. It does so by participating in electoral processes, even while it aspires to transform the rules of the political game" (Komadina and Geffroy 2007:20). As a ruling force, it has sought to transform those rules by means of constitution making (Cameron and Sharpe, Chapter 4 in this volume). The novelty of MAS is that it has one foot in the political-institutional context of a democratic regime and the other in the social sphere. It is a hybrid organization that combines two forms of political action and organization—participation in liberal electoral institutions and nonelectoral contentious bargaining—and, in doing so, it permeates the boundaries of the two spheres.

In a recent contribution by Bolivian journalist Fernando Molina (2007; see also Molina 2006), we find a systematic critique of MAS from a liberal perspective that is relevant for the present study. According to this author, MAS has adopted the liberal logic of representation and competition, but has done so only to gain state power, that is, without honest faith in democratic institutions and procedures. Molina sees this as detrimental to Bolivia's representative democracy, as MAS, he claims, uses liberal electoral politics instrumentally, as a means and not as an end in itself. Following this argument, MAS's ultimate goal is simply the pursuit of power for the radical transformation of society as it sees fit, be it with or without respect to the rule of law. However, this author fails to acknowledge that since its origins MAS has, in fact, embraced liberalism and has sought to correct the limitations of the previous restricted democracy by promoting novel forms of popular participation and inclusion of those previously excluded from political participation—groups that, empowered by the decentralization reforms of the 1990s, organized MAS and sought to change the given through combining their participation in liberal democratic institutions and nonelectoral politics. According to N. Postero (forthcoming), moreover, MAS can be seen as "profoundly liberal," as it uses "liberal institutions to enact a substantive new state model that can more effectively engage its citizens and provide for their welfare." By promoting broader participation and inclusion through liberal democratic institutions (through lawmaking in the congress, by appealing to the public in direct referenda, and by calling a constituent assembly with broad popular participation), MAS seeks to transform liberalism "to make it more democratic and more relevant to Bolivia's indigenous populations" (Postero, forthcoming). The Bolivian left, as represented by MAS, is more post-liberal than antiliberal.

Background and a Brief Evolution of MAS

More than a product of political engineering, MAS is the result of Bolivia's singular historical trajectory and how this course has affected the configuration of social forces as well as the incorporation of new actors into the larger political order. The formation of MAS and its rise to power have been influenced by the implementation and crisis of neoliberalism, which created losers that would then resist the hegemonic aspirations of this model; resistance to coca eradication and state violence, which acted as a unifying force in the emergence of powerful resistance movements; a permissive institutional context that facilitated the incorporation of new actors into the political system through direct popular participation; and the crisis of the state and representational institutions that became evident during Bolivia's commodity wars. Because the evolution of MAS is inseparable from recent developments in contemporary Bolivian politics, this section addresses these two things jointly.

Bolivia adopted a draconian neoliberal program during the mid-1980s, whose consequences are critical to understanding MAS's rise. Neoliberal reforms paved the way for the closure of most state-owned and -operated tin

mines, mining being the economic activity that had long dominated politics and society of the country. The closure of mines, in turn, coincided with a rapid increase of the coca and cocaine economy; as prices of drugs rose, thousands of miners and peasants were forced to relocate (Gill 2000). Some of these miners found a new home in the *cocales* (coca fields) of the Chapare and many found jobs in the profitable coca economy. Relocated workers, in particular miners, took with them their strong class consciousness and history of militant struggle and solidarity; as many had been involved with leftist and national-populist parties, they brought along considerable "militant capital" to the *cocales*. These workers influenced the coca growers' discourse by introducing elements of nationalism and Marxism that they had learned at the mines (Michel 2008). As a paradox of "relocalization," the move of miners to coca production contributed to the emergence of a powerful movement that opposed neoliberalism and the US-sponsored "War on Drugs." This movement formed a political instrument, advanced gradually through elections, and now controls the state.

Although political mobilization from peasant and indigenous communities was intense since Bolivia's return to democracy in 1982, it was with Law 1008 that such groups were able to unify their demands and gain strength. This law, which was promulgated under US pressure in 1988 as an effort to fight the cocaine economy, provided the legal framework for the eradication of coca crops. Its promulgation was followed by intense state repression and the Chapare region quickly became an unregulated territory, as this period was characterized by heated clashes between coca growers and the military. The political consequences of Law1008 were, at the time of its promulgation, difficult to foresee; however, in retrospect, state repression worked as a catalyst for the coca-growers' movement that prompted its participation in the formal political system by constituting a relatively united political front with other peasant and indigenous organizations. MAS's core social bases and constituency are the *cocaleros* in the Chapare, which, in addition to other peasant organizations, today claim ownership over the political instrument.

The first electoral victories came in the mid-1990s, after Bolivia embarked on a decentralization process. The reforms included the 1994 Popular Participation Law and the 1995 Law of Administrative Decentralization, which, taken together, involved the creation of more than three hundred municipalities throughout the country and instituted unprecedented direct municipal elections. They unleashed a process of "ruralization of politics" (Zuazo 2008), as the reforms recognized peasant and indigenous communities as agents of participation at the municipal decisionmaking level and extended new citizenship rights to indigenous peoples (Postero 2007). In other words, the reforms opened channels of participation. Peasant and indigenous organizations, such as the coca growers of the Chapare, formed their political and

electoral organizations and began participating in municipal elections, advancing gradually from the municipal level to the national one, yet combining this participation with nonelectoral politics. Unanticipated by neoliberal reformers, the losers of neoliberalism formed MAS and, taking advantage of the new opportunities to participate in local politics, sought to gain power in order to counter the thrust of neoliberalism (Van Cott 2005).

Having established an anchor in the Chapare, the challenge became winning majorities at the national level. This process would be facilitated by the cycle of protests initiated in the early 2000s. The spiral of social agitation started in Cochabamba during April 2000, when urban and rural social movements, as well as independent residents and middle classes, initiated mobilizations against the privatization of the water utility in what came to be known as the Water War. Local mobilizations in Cochabamba, as well as others in the highlands of La Paz and El Alto in September, strengthened the social movements and spawned an ideational shift against the hegemonic aspirations of neoliberalism, which had effects countrywide. While the escalation of social unrest reflected an acute crisis of the state and displayed the limits of neoliberal governance, it also provided a strong blow to traditional political parties as dominant representational institutions. The crisis facilitated the incorporation of new political formations into the larger political order.

MAS used this cycle to its advantage, and it moved strategically. In expanding from local to national levels (and from rural to urban) its leadership pursued a "supraclass strategy" of electoral recruitment (Przeworski and Sprague 1986). As a part of its repertoire, MAS opted for a simple vote-maximizing strategy that consisted of incorporating public intellectuals into its structure and turning for support to urban middle sectors. Appealing to the urban middle classes while participating actively in protest activities proved beneficial from the electoral point of view. And MAS saw an impressive electoral performance in the 2002 general election. In the end, however, MAS did not become government in 2002 as the conservative former President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada was able to craft a coalition that allowed him to return to the presidency. Despite this outcome, MAS emerged as the principal force "fighting neoliberalism both in the halls of Congress and on the streets" (Hylton and Thomson 2007:171).[4]

Reaching into the middle sectors to generate votes, however, involved a set of tradeoffs for the peasant organizations, as the recruitment of allies generated ideological and organizational transformations to the political instrument that, in turn, elicited derision from its core constituency. One example of such tradeoffs was related to the masista parliamentary brigade, which had "functions, positions, hierarchies, legislative imperatives" as well as "broad autonomy vis-à-vis the union structure" (Linera, León, and Monje 2004:433). MAS had managed to place twenty-seven deputies in the lower chamber in

2002 and thus accumulate some degree of institutional capital. While some of these deputies were representatives from the Chapare and had been selected by the bases through mechanisms of horizontal democracy (and thus became largely accountable to these bases), others were directly invited by the leadership, had no history of militancy in MAS, and had little checks from below. Unlike peasant representatives, however, many of the invited leaders had had parliamentary experience; thus they quickly became the voice of MAS, as they related to the media very effectively and knew how to play the institutional game. For Komadina and Geffroy (2007:99), the emergence of this parliamentary brigade brought forth an "*oligarchization* of the party leadership, which subsequently takes decisions different than the popular mandates, usually culminating in a sort of confiscation of the representation" (emphasis added). I will come back to this notion below.

The cycle of protests reached a peak in October 2003 with the Gas War that forced the resignation of President Sánchez de Lozada; it reached another peak in May–June 2005, leading this time to the resignation of President Carlos Mesa Gisbert and the call for early elections. Combining contentious bargaining with an electoral strategy proved to be beneficial for MAS. Due to Morales's participation in protest activities and his ability to articulate a broad cross-class coalition against the political establishment and neoliberalism, his popularity gradually increased until he finally won the presidency. Shortly after he assumed office, moreover, MAS conquered a majority of the electorate in the elections for the constituent assembly, whose mission was to write the country's new constitution. Because MAS gained barely above 50 percent of the seats for the assembly, it did not have the supermajority necessary to change the constitution without the support of opposition forces—forces that, in turn, were intransigent and not willing to compromise (Cameron and Sharpe, Chapter 4 in this volume). This, it should be noted, was a highly contested process and it reflected the regional dispute between the west and the east: MAS's agenda ignited opposition from the prefects in the affluent, predominantly white and mestizo, eastern departments dubbed the *media luna* (Santa Cruz, Beni, Tarija, and Pando), as they saw their interests threatened by the indigenous-led government and the new constitution. Because these departments have the largest gas reserves and the most fertile lands in the country, local business and landed elites quickly reacted against Morales by articulating an active right-wing countermovement that has henceforth opposed the constitution, demanded regional autonomy, and voiced its opposition to the central authority in La Paz (Eaton 2007).

In the end, the outcome of the constituent assembly was a text approved by progovernment delegates only. The text, in turn, needed to be submitted to the verdict of the people, which required that the congress sanction a law specifying the schedule and other details for the constitutional referendum. As MAS controlled the lower chamber but not the senate, this bill was blocked in congress until the events that followed the recall referendum of August 2008 shook the political arena. While Morales and MAS emerged victorious in this referendum, opposition prefects were overwhelmingly ratified in the media luna. These prefects did not wait to intensify their demands for autonomy and claimed its incorporation into the new constitution. In September 2008, groups demanding autonomy clashed with MAS supporters in the northern department of the Pando, leaving several *masistas* brutally massacred. Seeking to find a solution to the crisis, the government and regional autonomy leaders engaged in deliberations in congress, where the text of the constitutional draft was negotiated and modified, this time with inputs of opposition forces and with compromise from both sides. The text then became law with the constitutional referendum of January 2009, and it "appears to reflect a genuine attempt to combine indigenous with liberal and republican concepts of self-government" (Cameron and Sharpe, Chapter 4 in this volume). A year after its ratification, however, it remains to be seen how the constitution will be implemented.

Accountability Under the Government of Evo Morales

Becoming a ruling force altered the internal dynamics of MAS. This occurred as the notion of a "government of the social movements" became a real possibility. The process of becoming a ruling force involved the articulation of alliances with a wide array of social organizations; and this, in turn, involved the negotiation of spaces of power for these organizations, as many exchanged loyalty for spaces within the public administration. As a result, today, members of the organizations that spawned MAS perceive, not without reason, that a clique of new members has taken prominent roles within the government and the political instrument. For Román Loayza, who was one of the founding members of MAS and is now a dissident, "we [indigenous peasants] saw that leaders of social organizations that did not struggle like we did soon became spokespersons of MAS and they tried to utilize MAS for their own interests. We were upset as we watched this happening" (Loayza 2008).

It is here where the iron law of oligarchy (Michels 1962) clashes with the principle of "ruling by obeying." For Freya Schiwy (2008), "governing by obeying means that if the organizations and social movements that brought Morales to power find him failing to pursue their decisions, they are likely to force the president to step down." This, it should be noted, is just a part of the story, as one could add another equally important component: the embrace of this practice also implies an active participation of the social bases in the formulation and the correction of policies of redistribution. Where Morales has experimented with new participatory channels that deepen the liberal framework of participation, such as the recall and the constitutional referendums,

and thus proved his commitment to the first component, the second component seems to be just one of the many discursive tools set forth as MAS qualitatively shifted from being a social movement to being the government. It is based on the necessity to maintain bonds between MAS and the groups that facilitated its rise to power, and on the need to demonstrate that this government seeks to correct the failures of previous "pacted" democracies. But as will be shown, this works more on a rhetorical level than in practice.

The challenges facing MAS can be illuminated by the recent work of George Lakoff (2008) on how progressive and conservative political actors make sense of accountability. For progressives, "it means accountability to the public on the part of those in charge" (2008:185); thus, progressives think of accountability as something that constrains their power and authority. For conservatives, in turn, accountability is seen as a constraint, imposed by authority, on those who are in subordinate positions. This distinction is akin to Guillermo O'Donnell's (1994) suggestion that accountability has two basic dimensions: (1) horizontal and (2) vertical. The first dimension relates to the operations of the system of checks and balances among different branches of government and speaks to the workings of the separation of powers. The second dimension, in turn, focuses on elections and is based on the premise that the populace can oversee and sanction elected officials through the exercise of the suffrage. Building on O'Donnell's typology, C. Smulovitz and E. Peruzzotti added another dimension, (3) societal accountability, which is a "nonelectoral, yet vertical mechanism of control that rests on the actions of a multiple array of citizens' associations and movements and on the media, actions that aim at . . . activating the operation of horizontal agencies" (Smulovitz and Peruzzotti 2000:150). Taking this scheme even further, one could add dimensions of accountability that operate *within* organizations; thus it is possible to identify two additional types of accountability that are inherently hierarchical. The first type could be labeled (4) "vertical top-down," whereby those in charge control underlings and hold them accountable to the internal norms of the organization (or, at times, to his or her will). The second additional type, in turn, could be labeled (5) "vertical bottom-up," whereby members of an organization hold those in charge accountable. While the remainder of this section briefly addresses 1, 2, and 3, the rest of this chapter examines 4 and 5 at some length.

As noted above, Morales has centralized power in the executive and wields that power through his frequent use of direct public referenda. This, by the same token, highlights Morales's commitment to mechanisms of direct democracy, mechanisms that seek to deepen the liberal format of politics. Regarding vertical accountability, Bolivian voters have supported MAS in the elections for the constituent assembly of 2006, in the recall referendum held in August 2008,[5] and in the referendum for the approval of the new political constitution

that took place in January 2009. With regard to horizontal accountability structures, on the other hand, recent studies have shown that there has been a weakening of congress with regard to its role as an agent of control of the executive, which, it should be noted, is nothing new in Bolivian democracy and is today aggravated by the crisis of the party system and the lack of consolidated opposition parties. As for the mechanisms of societal accountability, organizations related to MAS have utilized contentious protest repertoires to activate horizontal agencies; for instance, they have often mobilized against opposition forces in congress, have surrounded the legislature, and have blocked the entrance of opposition members during critical moments, including during the negotiations that resulted in the draft of the new constitution. This, in turn, highlights one of the key peculiarities of MAS as it experiments with post-liberal politics: as a ruling force, it operates with one foot in the liberal democratic institutions and another in the noninstitutional nonelectoral terrain.

Accountability from Within: MAS as an Informal Organization

"We don't have a structure," party leaders often repeat. However, MAS does indeed have one, or even two (Komadina and Geffroy 2007). A close examination of how these structures operate will shed light on how some of the accountability mechanisms work within the organization. As will be seen, Morales has centralized power within MAS, even though, at times, his authority has limits.

There have been some fruitful attempts at explaining how MAS operates internally. A study by Moira Zuazo (2008) shows that, in rural areas, there are horizontal decisionmaking mechanisms for the selection of authorities to run for congress. These mechanisms vary for each organization and each region, are not codified in a single written norm, and are rooted in indigenous customs and traditions. As noted by Arditi (Chapter 8 in this volume) post-liberalism welcomes the interactions between uses and customs on the one hand and liberal democratic institutions on the other. The most important decisions regarding the selection of national-level authorities usually happen in national congresses, which are typically "largely crowded meetings where the multitude, composed of a great number of social organizations, decides [who is going to run] by public acclaim" (Peredo 2008). According to Ramiro Llanos, however, "this is a partial truth" as, in the end, "the selection of candidates ultimately depends on Morales's approval or, at a minimum, is conditioned by Morales" (Llanos 2008). As a result, whereas there are many representatives in the congress who were selected directly by their social bases, others, the so-called invited, have become authorities "without the support of any social or popular organization" (Peredo 2008).[6] While the former are subject to pressures from

their social bases, to which they are largely accountable, the latter enjoy a greater degree of autonomy and are not accountable to organized groups but to Morales.

Despite the decentralization in the selection of candidates, the locus of authority in MAS is currently Evo Morales. Formal leadership bodies such as the *direcciones* were created and formalized in the statutes as an attempt to extend the territorial reach of MAS. But even though those bodies do exist on paper, they lack independent authority vis-à-vis Morales. This perception is shared by José Antonio Quiroga, who states "for Evo it is hard to delegate, to share the power . . . he is very perceptive about what social leaders tell him. He is in constant contact with his bases and he does listen to them. But there is not an organic linkage between that and his decision. It is true that he listens, but that he rules by obeying is far from reality" (Quiroga 2008).[7] In the absence of effective formal channels of accountability, Morales remains the ultimate decisionmaker within the organization.

MAS maintains close linkages with various social organizations that brought it to power. Since its origins in the Chapare, its strongest and closest bonds have been to coca growers and these linkages have been formalized in its statutes. However, as MAS grew and expanded to urban areas and to the national level, it established alliances with preexisting urban organizations, linkages that have not been formalized. In their accords, urban social organizations have guaranteed for themselves a degree of participation in the government structure, be it as a representative at the congress or in the executive. Such is the case of Jorge Silva, a representative for urban artisan organizations, who claims that "this lets us [artisans] propose laws that facilitate and give more opportunities to the sector" (Silva 2008). These alliances, however, do not involve an organic participation in MAS's structure and this stands as a source of tension between organizations, which compete to control spaces of power, and also between organizations and MAS, which has not yet been able to incorporate the demands of these groups into its program. It remains to be seen what mechanisms MAS can implement to solve differences within as well as to formalize the channels of participation.

Insofar as such mechanisms are absent, Morales "is a referee and no one challenges his decisions" (Silva 2008). However, Morales is not the owner of the political instrument and he does not have absolute control over it. According to Román Loayza (2008), this is related to the features that shape a "political instrument," features that contrast with conventional understandings of political parties. In his words, "that MAS is a 'political instrument' means that social organizations appropriate MAS for themselves; there is no big boss, but a leader and that leader is now Evo Morales. . . . His bosses are the social organizations." This testimony exemplifies the belief in the mechanisms of bottom-up accountability within the organization. Interestingly, however, Loayza has recently renounced MAS, claiming that these structures have been coopted by Morales and his "neoliberal" surroundings, which, in his view, now control MAS. Loayza was accused of betrayal and expelled from MAS in April 2009 (*La Razón*, 30 April 2009b).

Although Morales has concentrated power in his hands, that is not to say he can do as he pleases, as there are accountability structures that are shaped by the nature of MAS's internal organization. It is precisely its informal features and the absence of a bureaucratic structure that leave maneuvering room for the social organizations that shape MAS. This heterogeneous network, at the same time, remains vastly decentralized, as each organization has its own internal structure and individual features. In many cases, popular organizations are not integrated into the statutes and they are autonomous from MAS, mobilizing both for *and* against the government and placing limits on Morales's leadership. In other words, while the lack of formal and democratic channels for participation allows Morales to occupy the central role in MAS, his leadership may be challenged by what occurs at the level of the social movements (Do Alto 2007). For example, events in Huanuni during October 2006 demonstrated how this may work. During that month, cooperativist and wage-earner miners clashed in Huanuni over the control of mining activities in the Posokoni hill.[8] The conflict left sixteen dead and more than sixty-eight wounded (*El Deber*, 7 October 2006a and 2006b), and led to the expulsion of Walter Villarroel, a leader of the National Federation of Mining Cooperatives, from the ministry of mining (*El Deber*, 7 October 2006b). On this occasion, the presence of cooperativist miners in the government structure did not impede this sector from expressing an autonomous position against government policies and from spurring on social conflict (see Zegada, Tórrez, and Cámara 2008). Although the strike was crushed by the government and did not force policy change, it demonstrated that Morales cannot fully control popular organizations from above.

Another example relates to the crisis of Cochabamba in January 2007, when groups related to MAS violently asked for the resignation of Manfres Reyes Villa, who was then the democratically elected prefect of Cochabamba. According to Do Alto (2007), although these organizations were close to MAS, they ignored Morales's desires to deactivate the protest and mobilized autonomously. This last example also illustrates how MAS embraces post-liberal politics, by doing politics with one foot in the institutional terrain and the other in the streets. The absence of formal channels of participation within MAS leaves maneuvering room for the social organizations that comprise it; when these mobilize with autonomy vis-à-vis the government, they can hold Morales accountable and place boundaries on his authority.

MAS in the Cities of La Paz and El Alto

Judging from its origins in the Chapare, some still insist that MAS is a peasant organization. The success of MAS, however, is due only in part to peasant mobilization. It is also "owed to members of the urban and informal economy, to popular, working-class, and middle-class rejection of the neoliberal governance in Bolivia that made their lives more difficult" (Albro 2007:314). Although MAS's strongest social bases are the coca growers in the Chapare, it can no longer be considered a peasant organization. To treat it as such is to overlook its organizational flexibility and the broader coalition of interests that it currently represents, as it has expanded itself to urban areas and became a ruling force.

The conurbation of La Paz and El Alto consists of an area with more than 1.5 million people. La Paz is Bolivia's principal city and its administrative and political capital and, together with El Alto, it comprises the biggest urban area of Bolivia, making both cities decisive players in national politics (Arbona and Kohl 2004; Albó 2006). These cities are often seen as critical to winning national elections and to ensure governability. Although MAS has broadened its constituency to urban sectors and won the hearts of Paceños (residents of La Paz) and Alteños (residents of El Alto), this process has not been accompanied by the consolidation of a structure that incorporates the interests of these urban populations. Fearing that one day MAS can lose the hearts of these sectors, party authorities believe it is imperative to "start building organically" (Torrico 2008).

MAS's experience in the cities of La Paz and El Alto is relatively recent and was influenced by a series of factors that facilitated its entrance into them. In the first place, this relates to the protest activities that took place in September–October 2000 in the department of La Paz. In September 2000, the conflicts that initiated in Cochabamba with the Water War spread to the highlands of La Paz as Aymara peasant leader and then leader of the Unique Confederation of Rural Laborers of Bolivia (Confederación Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia, or CSUTCB), Mallku Felipe Quispe,[9] led a series of indigenous social mobilizations and road blockades against the Bánzer government. The crowds of people demanded that the government fulfill a series of agreements it had celebrated with peasant workers (Espósito and Arteaga 2006). Although Quispe later formed his own party, the Pachakuti Indigenous Movement (Movimiento Indígena Pachakuti, or MIP), and rejected being associated with MAS (Van Cott 2005), his mobilizations acted as a blow to traditional political parties in the country. In a context of disenchantment with neoliberal governability and rejection of parties associated with corruption and ineffectiveness, Paceños and Alteños would then welcome MAS as a viable alternative.

In the second place, it is only possible to understand the urbanization of MAS in the context of a partisan dealignment, as its consolidation in La Paz, for instance, was only possible once CONDEPA started to lose influence in cities. Founded by Carlos Palenque in 1988, CONDEPA had emerged at the end of the 1980s to represent popular sectors that were "affected by adjustment policies and unrepresented by the established parties" (Mayorga 2006:154). This party was built around the charismatic leadership of Palenque, and its political practices combined the extensive use of clientelism, paternalism, plebiscitary appeals to the masses, unmediated relationships to constituents, and a strong antisystemic discourse (Revilla Herrero 2006; Alenda 2003). In part because CONDEPA failed to consolidate party structure and to forge organic linkages with its constituency, once the charismatic leader died in 1997 the party practically died along with its founder.[10] This party's loss of political power, however, "opened the doors of La Paz so that MAS could incorporate itself into the city" (Michel 2008). MAS entered the city and occupied vacated spaces that were created by the retreat of CONDEPA. And along with CONDEPA's evanescence, there was a transfer of their political practices to MAS. This occurred as ex-CONDEPA operators and leaders quickly became *masistas.*

MAS emerged as Bolivia's leading electoral force in the municipal elections of 2004, which consolidated the voting trend initiated in 2002. The 2004 elections were deeply affected by the first Gas War and its aftermath. While it would be inaccurate to say that Morales and MAS were the chief instigators of these contentious episodes (Lazar 2006), it quickly became clear that after the popular uprisings of October 2003 MAS came out as *the* political force able to incorporate popular discontent into a coherent political project. Although it won almost every municipality in the country, it could not win the municipal governments of La Paz and El Alto.

Evo Morales and MAS participated actively in the rebellions of May–June 2005, which forced the resignation of Carlos Mesa. However, the blockades and other pressure mechanisms were not well regarded by urban middle sectors, particularly in the city of La Paz, and Morales and MAS suffered a clear decline in popularity during these events, particularly in urban areas; however, they were still *the* referential force for the rest of left-wing forces. Recognizing this, after Mesa's June 6 resignation, some urban forces attempted to configure a broad front as a mechanism to incorporate a coalition of progressive forces into MAS in order to develop a comprehensive long-term program of government and as a collective effort to democratize MAS. The attempts to configure a strategic broad front failed, as MAS insisted on the "zero alliances" formula (Quiroga 2008). But perhaps as a sign of political opportunism, some of these forces—particularly the Movement without Fear (Movimiento Sin Miedo, or MSM)—decided to reach an accommodation with MAS and negotiated informal alliances that guaranteed spaces of power for their own candidates. Hours before the presentation of lists to the National Electoral Court (Corte Nacional Electoral, or CNE), the MSM placed some of

its candidates on MAS's lists. These two parties never formalized their accord before the CNE and their linkages remain loosely structured. As some of the MSM candidates performed fairly well in the elections, this situation generated discontent in the *masista* urban bases.

The Importance of Territorial Representation

MAS was initially resisted by residents of La Paz and El Alto. But as the crisis of representation became more evident, demands for participation increased in an inverse relationship to the crisis. When MAS pushed the rural base into these cities, it sought to articulate a local organization throughout the territory, and it rapidly managed to do so. In La Paz, this process was facilitated by the retreat of CONDEPA, which had left militants and leaders *a la deriva* (adrift). But on the other hand, it was complicated by the presence of the MSM, which, since the late 1990s, has been the dominant force in the city. This pushed MAS leaders to negotiate a strategic alliance with MSM, which, according to Román Loayza, was detrimental to MAS as it forced it to adopt MSM political practices and to include its militants in the public administration (Loayza 2008).

The articulation of MAS in El Alto was even more complicated, as a series of clientelist parties had long dominated that city's political life, and because this city was particularly shaken by the events of 2003—events that revealed a profound crisis of representation and that opened structures for the entrance of new parties. Before October 2003, leaders such as Bertha Blanco[11] and Cristina Martínez[12] sought to build a territorial structure in the city in the late 1990s and managed to gain some votes in the municipal elections of 1999. But during those days such efforts were timid, as "Alteños did not like MAS. Further, El Alto neither was important to Evo nor to anybody, as it was [dominated by] CONDEPA" (Blanco 2008). Led by a populist leader, CONDEPA's structure in El Alto was built around the exchange of concrete benefits for the loyalty of its members. In 1999, after what some consider the "lost decade" of CONDEPA's rule (Revilla Herrero 2006; Alenda 2003), the Revolutionary Left Movement (Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria, or MIR) returned to power with José Luis Paredes as the highest municipal authority. This party entered into a terminal crisis during the October events, and Paredes resigned while forming his own civic association, with which he won the municipal elections of 2004. Although by this time MAS had already built a precarious structure in the city, it managed to win only two *concejalías*.

MAS was not an organic product of these cities, but was inserted as something foreign. As such, it has faced obstacles as it has sought to organize a structure of its own on top of political configurations that already existed. Along with this organizing, MAS incorporated militants and party operators

that had previously militated in other parties. These incorporations were accompanied by a transfer of political practices that are now characteristic of MAS in these settings. But before examining these practices of MAS, I will outline how the party is organized at the local level.

Local Party Infrastructure

MAS's local infrastructure takes a pyramidal form, where the territorial districts constitute its base. This organizational pattern highlights the importance of territorial politics and representation. Although districts are not stipulated in the party charter (Movimiento al Socialismo 2004), they are the only local branches recognized by party authorities. The higher-level bodies prescribed in the statute are the *direcciones regionales*, but they only exist on paper. For national senator Antonio Peredo, "there aren't *direcciones regionales* in these cities. But they should exist, as this is established in the party charter. And they existed not too long ago. But how could districts configure a regional direction when [districts] are internally divided?" (Peredo 2008). The reasons why these regional bodies ceased to exist, however, are more complex than Peredo's explanation. As Elvira Parra put it, "we used to have regional directions, but since authorities kept fighting for political spaces and jobs, we no longer have these bodies" (Parra 2008).

Lacking *direcciones regionales* and regional leaderships, militants and leaders of urban districts interact with each other at the *dirección departamental*. This body channels all the activities and politics of MAS in these cities, and it is there where a horizontal linkage is being forged, as it provides local authorities the opportunity to relate with their counterparts of other districts. It is composed of executives of territorial districts in the department, and it is also composed of departmental executives of social organizations. This body has the capacity of imposing discipline on local branches and leaders, and these usually rely on the *departamental* to solve the problems that emerge within the districts.[13] As its president, Samuel Guarayos, put it, "if there happens to be a problem, we try to solve it. We have to struggle so that these local structures remain united" (Guarayos 2008). One problem, however, is that this unity is usually enforced and maintained from above and *a punta de palos* (by coercion) (Llanos 2008). It should also be noted that the absence of *direcciones regionales* means that local subunits find it hard to hold higher-level authorities accountable (Peredo 2008).

A Closer Look at the Urban Districts

The failure to incorporate territorial districts into the party charter creates a legal vacuum that shapes the entire life of the local branches. Despite the legal

vacuum, districts exist and carry out the bulk of MAS's mobilizational work in the cities, yielding immense benefits to the party. And because these are autonomous from the party leadership and are self-financed, they have considerable room for establishing their own agenda.

The internal organization of the districts replicates the hierarchical structure of higher-level bodies of MAS. Therefore, each district has an elected president, a vice president, as well as a number of commissions and secretariats. Being president of a district allows one to be elected to a regional, departmental, or even national leadership position.[14] But in the absence of *direcciones regionales* in the cities of La Paz and El Alto, there is a crisis of leadership at the regional level. Local authorities perceive this as an unfortunate "loss of political and participatory spaces" (Ticona and Apaza 2008), as a regional body would give districts broader spaces of representation in higher level bodies.

Districts have little say as to how departmental authorities are selected, and they lack effective mechanisms of control over higher-level authorities. As a local leader put it, "the territorial representations have, in theory, the capacity to select and control departmental authorities. But this time, for example, this process has been reversed. The departmental president has been elected first, and now he oversees the organizational problems in the districts." The same authority lamented that the vertical accountability structures between the districts and the departaments are strictly top down. In his words, "what occurs at the departmental level does not respond to a socialist structure that we believe we're participating in. This is not a bottom-up approach to politics" (Guzmán 2008).[15]

The party statutes also fail to prescribe a detailed set of procedures through which local authorities ought to be elected (Movimiento al Socialismo 2004). As a result, career paths for urban militants do not follow clear rules and procedures. For example, when the *dirección departamental* organizes a congress to select the authorities of a district, competing candidates can lobby the organizing body for the voting mechanism of their preference. Based on interviews with presidents of districts and with authorities in the departamental, two of the most common voting mechanisms seem to be the secret vote and public acclaimation. The latter mechanism favors the candidates who can mobilize the largest number of militants and it usually benefits the candidates who are more likely to promise more political spaces and job opportunities to their followers. In other words, the inexistence of fixed rules and procedures often leaves room for a sort of Darwinian "rule of the strongest," as aspiring authorities who are able to mobilize large numbers of constituents manage to choose their preferred voting mechanism to the detriment of competing authorities (for a parallel argument, see Do Alto 2006).

The lack of fixed rules and procedures to climb the hierarchical ladder within the MAS organization also leaves room for top-down control, causing organizational problems as well as frustrations at the level of the rank and file.

These organizational problems are related to the lack of opportunities in terms of public sector jobs. For example, urban militants perceive that their mobilizational strength has been critical to MAS's rise to power, but that their access to legitimate jobs in the public administration has been quite limited. As an authority in district number six of La Paz put it,

> Almost two and a half years of Morales's government and we [urban militants] are still living under the chains of the traditional system. We feel we are antisystemic in a party that claims to have new "open door" channels of participation. And when we don't find spaces for participation, who do we complain to? This reflects what is going on with the state apparatus and in the president's governability: almost 90 percent of those around him are "invited." (Quispe 2008)[16]

Beyond Territorial Representation: A Network of Social Organizations

In addition to the territorial structure, MAS has structured a broad network of alliances with urban social organizations. Although urban organizations and MAS had been growing closer since 2002 and amid a scenario of national crisis, their strategic alliance truly materialized with the 2005 general election campaign. Organizations representing artisans, microenterprises, pensioners, cooperative miners, and other urban sectors perceived the alliance with MAS as a unique opportunity to achieve parliamentary representation. In Jorge Silva's words, "one of the ways to guarantee the advancement of the social organizations of small producers that I represent was to have representatives in the congress; and now I am here [in the congress] as a result of the accord we reached with MAS" (Silva 2008). From MAS's perspective, this strategic move has provided the "political instrument" with a voting mass that has generated electoral majorities since 2005.

In El Alto, the main social organizations are El Alto Federation of Neighborhood Boards (Federación de Juntas Vecinales, or FEJUVE) and El Alto Regional Labor Federation (Central Obrera Regional–El Alto, or COR).[17] Although the statutes of these organizations prohibit their leaders from participating as officials of political parties, that prohibition has never stopped party operators from attempting to infiltrate these entities. This is because, as a rule, the control over these organizations serves to seduce the overall electorate and guarantees a degree of political stability in the city (Linera, León, and Monje 2004; see also Alenda 2003). MAS is not an exception to the rule and has not innovated much in these matters. Infiltrating the leadership levels of these organizations, which channel most of the political life in the city, allows political parties to extend their influence and control throughout the territory and to recruit leaders that mobilize large numbers of people.

Social organizations of La Paz and El Alto do not have any formal ties to MAS. But the party has configured an umbrella of informal alliances with key leaders and authorities of these urban organizations in an effort to insert the party into the cities and thus expand its social base. It is important to clarify that party operators have frequently worked with a top-down patron-client approach, as their strategy has consisted of seducing leaders of organizations in exchange for jobs in the public administration (or the promise of a job). From the outset, this approach has not consisted of building organic ties with the organizations as such. As Bertha Blanco put it, "when we were constructing MAS, we needed to find candidates. We didn't have candidates in the city, and nobody wanted to be associated with MAS. And what did we do? We went to find persons within the organizations, for example in the COR. And there we talked directly with the authorities" (Blanco 2008). However, what initially began as an effort to find candidates in these cities later evolved into a penetrating strategy aimed at controlling social organizations from the top. As a *masista* deputy for El Alto openly put it, "we can't deny we do that. We aim for our people to become leaders in these organizations. It is an effort to control the social organizations from the top" (Machaca 2008). Along these lines, as a former delegate to the constituent assembly explained, "the project we have had as MAS is to be able to take control over the social organizations. In order to do that, you need to start from working at the districts level and, from there, you can start climbing. For FEJUVE's next congress, for example, we have the wish that we're going to take on FEJUVE's leadership. . . . At least, that's what I can tell you we'd like to happen" (Parra 2008).[18]

These testimonies reveal a deliberate plan to penetrate the structure of social organizations and their networks and, through this strategy, to consolidate MAS's influence in the city. Simultaneously, because the party rewards loyal leaders (or, at least, it is expected that the party rewards them), this strategy creates a situation in which authorities within social organizations perceive these entities as "a trampoline for launching oneself into a public administration position" (Morales 2008). This can be exemplified with the case of FEJUVE. The highest authority of this organization since 2004, Abel Mamani, was appointed as the water minister for Morales's government in 2006.[19] His appointment translated into the direct presence of FEJUVE in the government structure. FEJUVE's presence in the government, in turn, entailed growing capacities for the organization to negotiate corporativist demands, as it provided it the opportunity to manage the res publica. On the other hand, FEJUVE's presence in the government structure hindered the possibilities of open confrontation between the social organization and the government. In other words, the organization was neutralized. As an authority of FEJUVE put it, "we have lost considerable capacities for mobilization. Why? Because leaders have occupied ministries and other public offices. . . . They have received quotas of power. But the people can see what their real interests are and thus it is difficult to articulate the organization" (Huanca 2008).[20]

In the case of COR-El Alto, the linkage with MAS is more subtle and less direct. Like FEJUVE, this organization supports, albeit not exempt of criticism, the government and the process of social transformation sponsored by MAS. Unlike FEJUVE, COR has never been represented directly in the government apparatus; COR has not physically occupied spaces of power under the Morales government. But party operators have sought to infiltrate this organization, and they have established negotiations directly with the leadership. In Edgar Patana's words, "Former executives of COR have always had rapprochements with political parties. Since 2002 they have been courting MAS so that they could negotiate spaces of power, such as a candidacy for deputyship or something else. But we have never been 'organic' members of MAS" (Patana 2008).

In addition, Patana laments the lack of participation of workers in the government structure. In his words "as Alteños, as workers, and as members of COR, we are represented by absolutely nobody in the government" (Patana 2008). Patana further laments the presence of "neoliberal" ministers within the Morales cabinet "whose very presence in the government structure has been detrimental to workers' interest." His testimony echoes that offered by Román Loayza when he renounced MAS in April 2009. Taken together, their critical positions toward MAS reveal a detachment by MAS from the social organizations that brought it to power. MSM leader Sebastián Michel attributes this to the consolidation of a "bureaucratic MAS," that is, a group of individuals who, while being alien to social organizations, control MAS (and the popular organizations that shape it) from the top.

In sum, because popular organizations such as FEJUVE and COR have not become "organic" members of MAS, they have no say in defining its programmatic lines. Instead, their links to the party are predominantly driven by pragmatism and the negotiation of spaces of power within the government. By the same token, MAS has attempted to control these organizations from above and thus erode their independence and autonomy.

Conclusion

MAS's rise to power coincided with a regional trend toward the election of left-wing leaders to occupy the presidency. But the "leftist" governments currently in office in Latin America are far from homogeneous. Whereas some authors have classified the current lefts by using dichotomies (e.g., "good" vs. "bad" left, "populist" vs. "social-democratic" left, and so forth) others have rejected such taxonomies partially on the grounds that they fail to explain where

Bolivia actually fits therein. As has been shown in this chapter, Morales largely owes his power to social mobilization from below. Although he exhibits populist features, he is not cut from the same cloth as other leaders like Hugo Chávez and Rafael Correa, to whom Morales is routinely equated (Weyland 2009; Vargas Llosa 2007; Castañeda 2006; Schamis 2006). Because Morales's leadership is rooted in years of social mobilization from below, to which he is accountable, he is a populist of a different kind than Chávez and Correa. But as has also been shown, the operations of the accountability structures are somewhat complex.

The Bolivian left turn could be portrayed as an instance of autonomous bottom-up social mobilization, yet it is combined with top-down attempts of cooptation by a charismatic leader. Morales is himself a product of bottom-up mobilization, but through his ruling MAS he now attempts to use the state to control the social organizations that brought him to power (which, it should be noted, may not be an easy task). Recent studies have shown that due to its peasant origins, MAS operates with decentralized and bottom-up schemes of participation; however, the chapter suggests that this occurs predominantly in rural areas, where MAS adopts "collective decisionmaking processes which are characteristic of the syndical peasant union organizational traditions" (Zuazo 2008:26). In those settings, for instance, MAS utilizes mechanisms of horizontal democracy for electing candidates to public office and for holding them accountable, which highlights the originality of its horizontal and bottom-up features, and reflects the ideals under which MAS was conceived.[21] Notwithstanding its innovative features, in the urban settings examined in this article, which are critical in order to win government and ensure governability, MAS has not innovated much in terms of political practices, and it operates according to the logics of a populist machine. This relates to how politics have played out historically in these urban settings, which are relatively new environments for the party, and where MAS replicates top-down client-patron schemes of participation. A current challenge for MAS is to incorporate (or adapt) some of the more egalitarian and innovative forms of participation in rural areas into urban environments. It remains to be seen how MAS can build a bridge between the "new" practices in rural areas and the clientelist practices that are more prominent in the cities, and thus build healthier party-society linkages in urban settings.

This chapter has revealed a set of continuities with older national-populist political parties such as MNR and CONDEPA, in terms of strategies for the occupation of the territory and, also, in terms of its linkages with urban social organizations. In the process of structuring itself in the cities of La Paz and El Alto and pushing its base to the cities, MAS absorbed existing and decaying structures of older political parties and, along with this absorption, MAS has incorporated their militants and adopted these parties' logics of action as well as their political practices. As a result, one *masista* vice minister lamented that "what we are seeing in these cities [in La Paz and El Alto] is a process of *condepización* of MAS. Whether we like it or not, MAS has a logic of action that reflects the remnants of CONDEPA logic" (Morales 2008). Comparative studies between MAS and how older national-populist parties in Bolivia articulated themselves and practiced politics in urban spaces will reveal much about breaks and continuities among them.

Notes

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1. Morales won the 2005 presidential elections with 1,544,374 votes (53.7 percent of those who voted). Far behind Morales, the second place went to Jorge "Tuto" Quiroga, leader of right-of-center Democratic and Social Power (Poder Democrático Social, or PODEMOS). He obtained 821,745 votes, which represented 28.6 percent of those who voted. Information retrieved from Bolivia's National Electoral Court (Corte Nacional Electoral, or CNE) on 26 March 2009.

2. Morales's landslide victory allowed MAS to become government without having to configure broad coalitions with other parties. This meant he was able to appoint cabinet members from autonomous indigenous groups and other social movements. The configuration of heterodox alliances was a dominant feature in the Bolivian political arena during 1985–2005, and this was known as the "pacted democracy." From 1985 until 2005, this superstructure took the form of a series of gentlemen's agreements concluded among the main party leaders in an effort to configure "stable" governments. In practice, this restricted and illiberal system excluded an entire section of the Bolivian population from participation, while it guaranteed the implementation and maintenance of some of the most conspicuous neoliberal restructuring in the Latin American region.

3. Álvaro García Linera is a prominent sociologist and current vice president of Bolivia.

4. The MAS obtained eight senators and twenty-seven deputies in the 2002 elections. Although Morales and three other deputies of MAS were elected to congress in 1997 and gained congressional experience (institutional capital) since then, their roles during the first term (1998–2003) were closely linked to noninstitutional politics. In 2002, during his first term, Morales was expelled from congress after being accused of leading violent protests against government-sponsored coca eradication campaigns. This incident, however, only helped to boost Morales's popular support and explains, at least in part, why MAS performed so well in the 2002 elections. It was in these elections that *masistas* multiplied themselves in congress and when MAS assumed the role of congressional opposition.

5. Morales was ratified with 67.41 percent of the votes nationwide. It should also be noted that opposition prefects were ratified in Beni, Pando, Tarija, and Santa Cruz.

6. Moira Zuazo (2008) also found that when the district is large and its inhabitants are not closely linked to social organizations, there is a tendency toward the invitation of candidates by *dedazo*. The selection of candidates through mechanisms of direct democracy is not common in such areas. The same occurs with plurinominal deputies and with national senators, as most of them are "invited."